Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination by Lopez, Angel & Rey, Patrick
Foreclosing Competition through High Access
Charges and Price Discrimination1
Ángel L. López2 and Patrick Rey3
2 April 2015
1This paper has beneted from helpful comments from Albert Banal-Estañol, Giulio Fed-
erico, Doh-Shin Jeon, Bruno Jullien, Gerard Llobet, Tommaso Valletti and an anonymous
referee, as well as conference participants at the XXIV Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Vigo,
2009), EARIE (Ljubljana, 2009), EEA (Barcelona, 2009), Conference on the Economics of
ICT (Telecom ParisTech, 2009) and seminar audiences at FEDEA, IESE, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra and the Florence School of Regulation. Ángel López gratefully acknowledges the nan-
cial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under ECO2008-05155 and
ECO2011-29533, and from Juan de la Cierva Program. Patrick Rey gratefully acknowledges the
nancial support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Communitys
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) Grant Agreement N 340903.
2Departament dEconomia Aplicada (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), and Public-
Private Sector Research Center (IESE Business School); email: angelluis.lopez@uab.cat.
3Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI, Allée de Brienne 31000 Toulouse;
email: patrick.rey@tse-fr.eu
Abstract
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and
a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tari¤s and may charge di¤erent prices
for on-net and o¤-net calls. When access charges are high, this allows the incumbent to
foreclose the market in a protable way if switching costs are su¢ ciently large. In the
absence of termination-based price discrimination, however, such foreclosure strategies
are not protable.
1 Introduction
Telecommunication networks need to access rivalscustomers in order to provide univer-
sal connectivity. Hence the same network operators that compete at the retail level for
subscribers, must also cooperate at the wholesale level, where they must agree on access
conditions and, in particular, on the level of the access charge (also called termination
charge) for terminating each others calls. In this setting, we explore the concern that
high access charges may allow incumbent operators to foreclose the market.
So far, most of the literature has instead focused on the concern of excessivecoop-
eration. Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) showed for instance that
when networks compete in uniform, linear prices, then they can soften this competition
by agreeing on a high reciprocal access charge: Raising the access charge increases the
marginal cost of calls, which encourages operators to maintain high prices. Since then, the
analysis has been enriched to allow for non-linear retail pricing, termination-based price
discrimination, or dynamic competition.1 Interestingly, when non-linear retail tari¤s are
considered, most of this literature nds that network operators would favor low (even
below cost) access charges, in stark contrast with the policy debate where in practice,
operators have been resisting regulatory pressures to decrease termination rates.2
Yet, in markets where large incumbent operators face competition from smaller rivals,
antitrust and regulatory agencies have voiced the concern that cooperation may rather
be insu¢ cient.The concern stems from tari¤-mediated network e¤ects, i.e., situations
where consumers have a preference for joining a popular network, purely due to the price
structure of calls. The logic is that if the access charge is above cost, then prices are
higher for o¤-netcalls (i.e., those to subscribers on other networks) and, as a result,
customers will favour larger networks, in which a higher proportion of calls remain on-
net(i.e., on the same network). For example, in their Common Position the European
regulators not only argue in favour of symmetric access charges but also express the con-
cern that, because of network e¤ects, "an on-net/o¤-net retail price di¤erential, combined
with signicantly above-cost [access charges], can, in certain circumstances, tone down
competition to the benet of larger networks".3 Similar concerns have been voiced in
national decisions.4
1See for instance La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b), Gans and King (2001), De Bijl and Peitz (2002,
2004), and López (2008). For a review of this literature, see Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and
Peitz, Valletti and Wright (2004).
2We discuss further this literature and possible solutions to this puzzle in Section 7.
3See ERG (2008) at p. 97. The Common Position also stresses that these network e¤ects can be
exacerbated via incoming calls: as a high o¤-net price reduces the amount of o¤-net calls, it also lowers
the value of belonging to the smaller network since less people will then call the customers of that
network.
4See for example, the French regulators decision of October 2007 (Section 4.2.2 of ARCEP Decision
2007-0810 of October 4 2007) and the Spanish regulators decision of September 2006 (Decision AEM
2006/726, pp. 13-14 and 33).
1
To explore this issue, we examine competition between two asymmetric networks,
an incumbent and a new entrant, for a given reciprocal access charge.5 Customers are
initially attached to the incumbent network and incur switching costs if moving to the
other network.6 Thus, as in Klemperer (1987), to build market share the entrant must bid
more aggressively for customers than the incumbent, which enjoys greater market power.
Of course, the incumbent operator could keep monopolizing the market if switching costs
were large enough. But as we will see, even when switching costs are not that large,
high access charges can help the incumbent operator maintain its monopoly position and
prot.
We rst consider the case where networks not only compete in subscription fees and
in usage prices, but can moreover charge di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls. In
the case of symmetric networks, building on La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), Gans and
King (2001) show that a (reciprocal) access charge below cost reduces competition and
raises the rmsprot. We show that, in the case of asymmetric networks, this carries
only so long as the two networks share the market. By contrast, a large enough access
charge enables the incumbent operator to corner the market, in which case its prot
increases with the access charge. The maximum prot that it can obtain in this way
depends however on the degree of product di¤erentiation as well as on the magnitude of
switching costs and network e¤ects. In particular, foreclosure is protable if switching
costs are not too low, products are not too di¤erentiated and network e¤ects are large
enough. We also discuss welfare e¤ects: Increasing the access charge reduces the value
of o¤-net calls, a negative e¤ect however compensated by the expansion of the market
share of the dominant operator (which reduces the proportion of o¤-net calls).
We then show that price discrimination between on-net and o¤-net calls is a key factor
for foreclosure. Indeed, absent such on-net pricing, foreclosing the market through high
access charges is never protable it is moreover no longer feasible in a receiver-pays
regime, i.e., when network operators also charge for call receptions. Thus, the price-
mediated network e¤ects stemming from on-net pricing are essential for the incumbent
operator to protably keep the entrant out of the market and still charge monopoly prices.
Despite the concerns voiced by regulators, few papers have studied the role of mobile
termination rates in foreclosing entry. Calzada and Valletti (2008) and Hoernig (2007)
however explore this issue and their work is thus most closely related to ours. Calzada
and Valletti (2008) rst consider a symmetric oligopoly and show that, as with two rms,
equilibrium prots decrease with the access charge. Building on this insight, they stress
that incumbent operators may still favour above-cost access charges, in order to deter
5In most countries access charges are indeed symmetric, due either to bilateral agreements or regula-
tory intervention. [Some regulators have let new entrants charge slightly higher termination rates for a
limited period of time, but such rate asymmetry has progressively been phased out.]
6Grzybowski (2008) nd that consumers of mobile services in UK face signicant switching costs.
Grzybowski and Pereira (2011) also nd large switching costs in the Portuguese mobile market.
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entry: While doing so decreases ex post the prot of the incumbents, for any given number
of market participants, from an ex ante standpoint it may constitute a protable strategy,
by limiting the number of entrants. This however requires the incumbent operators to
commit themselves not to modify ex post the access charge; otherwise, the incumbent
operators would have an incentive to decrease the access charge and, anticipating that,
potential competitors would enter the market. By contrast, in our analysis the dominant
operator nds it protable to foreclose the market through a high access charge, even
from an ex post standpoint  in particular, our setting allows the smaller operator to
remain in the market and exert a competitive pressure even if it is foreclosed. Our
analysis thus does not require any commitment assumption.
Hoernig (2007) analyzes the impact of call externalities (namely, taking into account
the utility of receiving calls) on the equilibrium price structure. He rst shows that such
call externalities yield higher on-net/o¤-net price di¤erentials, even in the absence of
anti-competitive intent. He then shows that predatory motives would induce even greater
on-net/o¤-net price di¤erentials: That is, increasing this di¤erential is the least costly
way(in terms of sacriced prot), for the dominant operator, to inict a given loss of
prot on its smaller rival. Assessing the protability of these predation scenarios would
however involve a comparison between the short-term sacrice of prot and the long-term
benet from reduced competition. By contrast, our analysis shows how foreclosure can
arise even in a static framework.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The next two
sections analyze the impact of a (reciprocal) access charge on retail competition: Section
3 shows that, as long as the market remains shared, an increase in the access charge
reduces prots; Section 4 shows however that on-net pricing and a high enough access
charge enables the incumbent operator to protably foreclose the market. Section 5
illustrates the main insights by means of a simple example. Section 6 analyses the case
of no termination-based price discrimination under both the caller-pays and the receiver-
pays regime. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There are two network operators: an incumbent, I, and an entrant, E. The two operators
have the same cost structure: It costs f to set up a customers service, and each call costs
c  cO + cT , where cO and cT respectively denote the costs borne by the originating and
terminating networks. To terminate an o¤-net call, the originating network must pay a
reciprocal access charge a, which is taken to be exogenous, to the terminating network.
The access mark-up is thus equal to:
m  a  cT :
3
We will treat here the access charge as exogenous; later on, we study its impact on the
equilibrium outcome.
Networks o¤er services that are horizontally di¤erentiated à la Hotelling. Consumers
are uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1], and the two networks are located at
the two ends of this segment. Consumers tastes are represented by their location on
the segment and taken into account through a transport cost t > 0, reecting their
disutility from not enjoying their ideal type of service. For a given volume of calls q, a
consumer joining a network located at a distance x obtains a gross utility given by
u(q)  tx;
where u(q) denotes the variable gross surplus, with u0 > 0 > u00 and u0 (0) = +1.7
Throughout the paper, we will assume that u(0), the xed surplus derived from being
connected to either network, is large enough to ensure full participation.8 Finally, we
assume that consumers switching to Es network incur a cost s > 0.
Each network i = E; I o¤ers a three-part tari¤ Ti = (Fi; pi; p^i), where Fi is the sub-
scription fee, and pi and p^i respectively denote on-net and o¤-net usage prices. Demand
q(p) is dened by u0(q(p)) = p with q > 0. Letting i denote network is market share
and assuming a balanced calling pattern,9 the net surplus o¤ered by network i is (for
i 6= j = I; E):
wi = iv(pi) + jv(p^i)  Fi;
where
v(p) = u(q(p))  pq(p)
denotes the consumer surplus for a price p.
In the next sections we rst characterize, for a given (reciprocal) access charge, the
equilibrium of the competition game where networks simultaneously set their retail tari¤s
(subscription fees and usage prices), and consumers then choose a network and how much
to call. We then study the impact of the access charge on this equilibrium.
3 Shared-market equilibria
In this Section we focus on shared-market equilibria restricting attention to stable equi-
libria, achievable through a standard tâtonnement process. We rst characterize usage
7This condition simplies the exposition by ensuring that consumers always make calls. See footnote
19 for a discussion of its implications.
8This surplus may for example reect the benets from complementary services such as SMS, data
services or the ability to receive calls for free (as is the case in most countries outside the U.S.), which
are not explicitly modeled here.
9This assumption implies that, for equal prices, calls terminate on the two networks in proportion to
their respective customer bases.
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prices, before discussing network externalities and market shares; we then characterize
the condition under which a shared-market equilibrium exists, and show that it is then
unique.
Marginal-cost pricing. Network is prot is equal to:
i  i [i(pi   c)q(pi) + j(p^i   c m)q(p^i) + Fi   f ] + ijmq(p^j):
As usual, as the operators can use the xed fees to share the surplus, they have an
incentive to maximize this surplus by setting prices reecting (perceived) marginal costs,
equal to the true cost c for on-net calls and augmented by the access mark-up m for
o¤-net calls:
Lemma 1 In any shared-market equilibrium, usage prices are equal to marginal costs:
pSi = c; p^
S
i = c+m:
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a result, even though each network i pays ijmq(p^Si ) to its rival, there is no
net interconnection payment; as both networks charge the same o¤-net price
 
p^Si = p^
S
j

,
neither the incumbent nor the entrant has a net outow of calls: ijm
 
q(p^Sj )  q(p^Si )

=
0, whatever networksmarket shares.
Network Externalities and consumersresponse. As the o¤-net price increases
with the access mark-up, departing from cost-based access charges generates tari¤-mediated
network externalities. For example, if the access mark-up is positive, prices are higher for
o¤-net calls (c+m > c) and the subscribers of a network are thus better o¤, the more
customers join that network. As usual with network e¤ects, di¤erent expectations may
yield di¤erent even multiple consumer responses. We will assume that, given networks
prices, consumers have self-fullling expectations; market shares thus constitute a xed
point of the reaction to anticipations.10 And to ensure that this consumer response
is unique, we will assume that tari¤-mediated network externalities are not too large,
compared with consumersrelative taste for the two networks:11
t > v(c)  v(1): (1)
The following Lemma characterizes this unique consumer response:
10We thus assume here that expectations respond to pricing deviations. Hurkens and López (2014) con-
sider instead the case of passive self-fullling equilibrium expectations, that do not respond to deviations.
They nd that this attenuates the so-called waterbed e¤ect (the extent to which higher termination rev-
enues are passed on to consumers through lower subscription fees), and even annuls it in case of duopoly.
11This condition corresponds to the stability condition introduced in La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b,
p. 52), and ensures that a small increase in the market share of a network cannot trigger a snowballing
process towards that network.
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Lemma 2 In any shared-market outcome, consumers response to networks prices is
given by:
I (FI ; FE) = 1  E (FI ; FE) = 1
2
+
FE   FI + s
2(m)
; (2)
where
 (m)  t  [v(c)  v(c+m)] > 0:
Proof. See Appendix B.
As usual, network is market share decreases with its own price and increases with
the rivals price, and all the more so when networks are close substitutes (i.e., t is small).
Incumbency moreover confers an advantage to I, as consumers must incur the switching
cost s if they subscribe to E; hence, for equal prices, I attracts a larger market share
than its rival, and all the more so when the switching cost is large. In addition, price-
mediated network externalities also a¤ect the sensitivity of market shares to networks
prices. For instance, for m > 0 consumers favour large networks (as o¤-net usage prices
then exceed on-net ones), which tends to exacerbate consumers responses to a price
di¤erential: O¤ering a better price attracts more consumers, which in turns makes the
network more attractive for additional consumers, and so on. Condition (1) rules out
tipping,but market shares do become more sensitive to prices as m increases.
Subscription fees and market shares. We now complete the characterization of
the equilibrium. Intuitively, we would expect the operators to share the market as long
as the switching cost is not too large. The following Lemma conrms this intuition, and
moreover shows that the equilibrium is then unique:
Lemma 3 A stable shared-market equilibrium exists if and only if
s <  (m)  3 (m) + 2mq (c+m) : (3)
Conversely, when this condition holds, there exists a unique stable shared-market equilib-
rium, in which subscription fees and market shares are respectively equal to:
F Si (m) = f + (m) +
is
 (m)
[(m) +mq(c+m)] ; (4)
SI (m) = 1  SE (m) =
1
2

1 +
s
 (m)

: (5)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Condition (3) shows that a (stable) shared-market equilibrium exists (in which case
it is unique) when:
 Switching costs are not too large: Switching costs confer market power to the in-
cumbent, who obtains a larger market share (I > 1=2), which moreover increases with
s.
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 The entrant is su¢ ciently di¤erentiated from the incumbent: Consumers are more
likely to stick to their favourite network in case of strong di¤erentiation; as  increases
with the di¤erentiation parameter t, the market is more likely to be shared when t is
large, and Es market share moreover increases with t. For example, for cost-based
access charges (m = 0), the market is shared as long as t > s=3.12
 Network e¤ects are not too large: When the access charge lies above cost, network
e¤ects confer a comparative advantage to the larger operator; this reinforces the market
power of the incumbent, which becomes more likely to corner the market. Indeed,  (m)
decreases as m increases above cost:
 0 (m) =  q (c+m) + 2mq0 (c+m) ; (6)
which is negative for m  0.
The expression of the subscription fees given by (4) is also intuitive:
 As usual when total demand is inelastic, perceived costs are passed through to
consumers: Any increase in the connection cost f is fully borne by subscribers.
 The second term,  (m) = t   [v (c)  v (c+m)], reects the impact of product
di¤erentiation and network e¤ects on competition. Product di¤erentiation softens com-
petition: Subscription fees increase with the product di¤erentiation parameter t. By
contrast, network e¤ects tend to intensify competition when m is positive: As o¤-net
calls are then priced above on-net calls, consumers prefer to join larger networks, all else
being equal; this, in turn, induces networks to bid more aggressively for marginal cus-
tomers. This e¤ect becomes larger as the termination rate increases, as this reduces the
value of o¤-net calls, v (c+m).
 Here, however, switching costs confer a comparative advantage to the incumbent,
reected in the third term: The incumbent network charges a higher price than the
entrant, and all the more so when switching costs are large. This e¤ect, too, becomes
larger as the termination mark-up increases, at least as long as this raises the termination
revenue, mq (c+m).13
12As mentioned earlier, the utility derived from being connected to either network is supposed to be
large enough to ensure full participation. Under cost-based access charges, the marginal consumernet
utility is equal to:
v (c)  FI   tI = v (c)  s  FE   tE = v (c)  f   3t+ s
2
.
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for full participation is v (c) > f + 3t: This indeed ensures that the mar-
ginal consumer obtains a positive net utility whenever a shared-market equilibrium exists, i.e., whenever
t > s=3.
13We have:
d
dm

(m) +mq(c+m)
 (m)

=
(m) ddm [mq(c+m)] +mq
2 (c+m)
 2 (m)
;
which is positive when ddm [mq(c+m)] > 0 and m  0.
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The incumbency advantage is also reected in Is equilibrium market share, which
increases with s, all the more so when the access charge raises further above cost (as
 (m) then decreases with m see (6)).
Impact of the access charge. We now examine the impact of the access charge on
equilibrium prots.
Starting from cost-based termination rates (m = 0), increasing the access charge (i)
increases the intensity of competition (as reected in the term  (m) in (4)) and (ii)
confers a comparative advantage to the incumbent, whose market share increases at the
expense of the entrant. It follows that the entrant would always favour below-cost access
charges.
The same would apply to the incumbent in the absence of switching cost, as net-
works would then be symmetric. This result, rst derived by Gans and King (2001), has
been shown to hold for more than two networks (Calzada and Valletti, 2008) as well as
in the presence of call externalities (Berger, 2005) or when subscription demand is elastic
(Hurkens and Jeon, 2012).
The impact of the access charge on the prot of the incumbent is more nuanced in the
presence of switching costs, as they provide a comparative advantage that also increases
with the termination mark-up. Yet, the next proposition shows that, as long as the market
remains shared, the incumbent operator still favours access charges below cost:
Proposition 1 In the range of access charges yielding a shared-market equilibrium:
 (i) Both networks equilibrium prots are higher for a cost-based access charge
(m = 0) than for any positive termination mark-up (m > 0).
 (ii) A small termination subsidy (m < 0) gives both networks even greater prots.
Proof. See Appendix D.
While this proposition appears to extend the previous results, it only applies to ter-
mination mark-ups that are small enough to yield a shared-market equilibrium. As we
will see, a large network may actually favour more extreme termination mark-ups that
allow them to corner the market and charge high prices.
Welfare analysis. As all consumers subscribe (full participation) and usage prices
reect perceived marginal costs, total welfare (net of switching and transport costs) is
equal to:
W (m) 
h 
SI (m)
2
+
 
SE (m)
2i
v(c) + 2SI (m)
S
E (m) [v (c+m) +mq (c+m)]
 f   SE (m) s 
Z SI (m)
0
txdx 
Z 1
SI (m)
t(1  x)dx: (7)
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The rst two terms reect the social value of on-net and o¤-net calls, respectively, whereas
the other terms account for connection, switching and transport costs. Increasing the ac-
cess charge above cost degrades the social value of o¤-net calls (i.e., v (c+m)+mq (c+m)
decreases withm for m > 0) and expands the market share of the incumbent (i.e., SI (m)
increases with m).
When the access charge is cost-based (m = 0), there are no network e¤ects and welfare
is simply driven by switching cost and relative preference considerations. The e¢ cient
market share of the entrant would make the marginal consumer x = I indi¤erent between
sticking to the incumbent or incurring the switching cost and turning to the entrant; that
is, it should satisfy
teffI = s+ t

1  effI

;
or
effI =
1
2
+
s
2t
:
However, as noted above in equilibrium the incumbent exploits its market power and
charges a higher fee than the entrant, which gives the entrant a higher share: SE (0) >
effE . Furthermore, starting from m = 0, a small change in m only has a second-order
e¤ect on the social value of o¤-net calls, against a rst-order reduction of the market
share of the entrant. It follows that raising m slightly above cost enhances total welfare.
For higher levels of the access charge, the social value of o¤-net calls becomes sig-
nicantly deteriorated, which tends to reduce welfare. A redeeming virtue, however, is
that increasing Is market share reduces the share of o¤-net calls. It is straightforward to
show that this redeeming virtue actually ensures that reducing further Es market share
keeps enhancing total welfare, a positive e¤ect however counter-balanced by the distor-
tion on the volume of o¤-net calls. LetW S (m) denote total welfare in the shared-market
equilibrium, for m satisfying (3) we have:14
dW S
dm
(m) =
s
 (m)
[t+  (m)]
dSI
dm
+ 2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m) . (8)
The rst term is positive, conrming that, as the access charge increases above cost,
the expansion of Is market share keeps enhancing total welfare even when it becomes
larger than effI ; the second term is however negative, reecting the downward distortion
on o¤-net calls (q0() < 0). Note that this second term vanishes not only for m = 0, but
also for SE = 0; it follows that total welfare increases with m both when the termination
is almost cost-based, as already noted, and when there is almost complete foreclosure
(i.e., s close to  (m)).
14See Appendix E.
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4 Protable foreclosure through high termination rates
We now show that the incumbent operator can nd it protable to corner the market
through high termination rates.15
Cornered market equilibria. From Proposition 3, as m increases E attracts fewer
and fewer subscribers, and its market share vanishes when m reaches the level given by
(9), namely
m^ (s)    1 (s) : (9)
Intuitively, we would expect I to corner the market whenm further increases. The follow-
ing Proposition conrms this intuition and shows furthermore that Is equilibrium prot
then increases with the access charge:
Proposition 2 When m  m^ (s), there exists an equilibrium in which I corners the
market, and:
 Usage prices reect (perceived) marginal costs: pCi = c and p^Ci = c+m for i = I; E.
 Subscription fees are FCE (m) = f   mq (c+m) and FCI (m) = f + s    (m)  
mq (c+m).
Proof. See Appendix F.
This result calls for two comments. First, the Proposition identies an equilibrium,
but other ones exist as well (in which I still corners the market):
 As in classic asymmetric Bertrand competition games, there are equilibria with
lower subscription fees: If E charges a lower fee, I must match it in order to keep
cornering the market; conversely, if I matches the price cut, E is willing to maintain the
lower fee, as it does not attract any subscriber anyway. These other equilibria however
rely on weakly dominated strategies for E. By contrast, in the equilibrium characterized
by the proposition, E o¤ers a subsidy, equal to mq (c+m), but would break even if it
attracted a subscriber: The subsidy corresponds to the termination revenue generated by
the subscriber.
 In addition, for the sake of exposition we restrict attention to equilibria where all
usage prices are cost-based, as was the case for shared-market equilibria. However, when I
corners the market, the reasoning underlying Lemma 1 only ensures that I must price on-
net calls at cost (i.e., Is equilibrium on-net price must be pCI = c); the other usage prices
(namely, Is o¤-net price, p^CI , and Es prices, p
C
E and p^
C
E), being unusedin equilibrium,
15We restrict attention here to above-cost access charges (i.e., m  0), as these have been the focus
of the policy debate. It can be checked that the entrant can never corner the market in this range see
López and Rey (2012).
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need not reect perceived costs.16 And indeed, there exist other equilibria, in which I
still corners the market but o¤-net prices are not equal to c+m.17 However, the analysis
of these additional equilibria is notationally more cumbersome, and does not materially
a¤ect the main qualitative insights.
Second, asm increases above m^, network e¤ects exacerbate Is comparative advantage
to such an extent that I can increase its subscription fee even though Es subscription
fee keeps decreasing as long as raising m increases the termination revenue mq (c+m).
It follows that Is prot, given by
CI (m)  FCI (m)  f = s  (m) mq(c+m);
increases with the access charge m for m > m^.
Impact of the access charge. It follows from the above analysis that, if
s > s   (0) = 3t;
I corners the market even with cost-based access charges (m = 0); conversely, the market
remains shared even with innite access charges if18
s < s   (1) = 3 (t ) ;
where
  v (c)  v (1)
denotes the maximal scope for network e¤ects (note that s > 0 under (1)). We now focus
on the case s < s < s, where the incumbent can foreclose the market when and only when
the access charge is su¢ ciently high. Foreclosing the market in this way is protable for
I when the maximum prot that it can obtain,19
CI (1) = s  t+ ;
exceeds the prot that it could obtain by sharing the market for m = 0, which is equal
16We thank a referee for pointing this out. The same applies to deviations: A deviation aiming at
cornering the market need not involve a cost-based o¤-net price. Proposition 2 however characterizes a
trueequilibrium: It survives any deviation, even those with usage prices that are not cost-based.
17In particular, there exist cornered-market equilibria, based on higher o¤-net prices, for m slightly
below m^.
18For the sake of exposition, we assume here that the termination revenue mq (c+m) vanishes as the
termination charges goes to innity (that is, usage demand is su¢ ciently elastic).
19When demand vanishes for high usage prices, i.e., when q (c+m) = 0 form larger than some m, then
the cornered-market equilibria characterized by Proposition 2 exist only if m^ (s) < m, and the maximum
prot from foreclosure becomes CI ( m). In the same vein, if we relax the assumption (1) ensuring that
consumersresponse to prices is uniquely dened, then the above analysis applies as long as  (m) > 0,
which may put another upper bound on the admissible range for the termination mark-up.
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to
SI (0) =
t
2

1 +
s
3t
2
: (10)
The above analysis and the comparison of these two prot levels yield:
Proposition 3 (i) When s  s, I corners the market even under cost-based termination
(m = 0), and any increase in the access charge above cost enhances Is prot.
(ii) When s < s, raising the access charge above cost does not enable I to corner the
market, and thus always reduces Is prot.
(iii) Finally, when s 2 [s; s), raising the access charge su¢ ciently above cost (namely,
m  m^ (s)) enables I to corner the market, and any further increase in m increases Is
prot; furthermore, when s > s^, where
s^ 
 
2 
r
1 + 2

t
!
3t
lies between s and s, foreclosing the market in this way is protable for I, for a large
enough access charge.
Proof. See Appendix G.
That the incumbent can corner the market when the switching cost is large enough is
intuitive. More interestingly, even when it could not do so under cost-based termination
(i.e., when s < s), raising the access charge can enable the incumbent to foreclose the
entrant, and this can be protable when the switching cost is signicant: When s^ < s < s,
I and E would share the market for m = 0, whereas I corners the market for m  m^ (s),
and obtains in this way a higher prot than for m = 0 when m is large enough. The
analysis furthermore shows that this is more likely to happen when the networks are not
too di¤erentiated and/or networks e¤ects are substantial (it can indeed be checked that
s^ increases with t and instead decreases as  increases).
Finally, note that s > s^ amounts to
SI (0) =
1
2

1 +
s
3t

>
1
2
 
3 
r
1 + 2

t
!
;
where the right-hand side lies above 3 
p
3
2
' 63% as long as  < t. Therefore, for
foreclosure to be protable, I should keep at least about two-thirds of the market under
cost-based access charges.
Welfare analysis. In the rangem  m^ (s), where I corners the market, total welfare
remains constant: No consumer incurs the switching cost, total transport cost remains
equal to
R 1
0
txdx, and all calls (being on-net) are priced at cost (p = c); hence, total
12
welfare is equal to
WC = v (c) 
Z 1
0
txdx  f;
and thus remains constant as m increases: I simply appropriates a larger share of this
surplus, at the expense of consumers, who face an increase in the subscription fee FCI .
To be sure, this welfare analysis is mainly relevant in the short-term, as it assumes
that the entrant keeps exerting a competitive pressure even when its market share van-
ishes. A more complete analysis should take into consideration the risk of exit (but would
also need to account for the operators incentives to price strategically, so as to build
customer bases).
5 Illustration
In this section we illustrate the analysis using a constant-elasticity demand of the form
q(p) = dp ", where d > 0 and " > 1;20 the consumer surplus is then given by
v(p) = v0 + d
p1 "
"  1 ;
where v0 is supposed to be large enough to ensure full participation.
For illustrative purposes, we adopt the following parameter values: " = 1:6, cT = 0:5,
c = cO + cT = 2, f = 0, d = 5, t = 6 and s = 10. Condition (1) is thus satised, as
t = 6 >  ' 5:5, and the feasible range for the access mark-up is m   cT =  0:5. In
addition, s = 18 > s > s^ ' 5:7 (> s ' 1:5).
Figure 1 represents the equilibrium market shares as a function of the access charge.
As s < s, E gains some market share under cost-based termination: SE (0) = 2=9 ' 22%;
this market share decreases withm in the range where the market is shared. Furthermore,
20This condition ensures that the termination revenue, mq (c+m), vanishes as m goes to innity.
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as s > s, I forecloses the market when the access charge exceeds m^ (s) ' 7:5.
Figure 1. Equilibrium market shares.
Figure 2 represents the impact of the access charge on Is equilibrium prot:
 In the range m < m^ (s) ' 7:5 (including in the limited admissible range of negative
values for m), where the two networks share the market, both operatorsprots
decrease as m increases; bill and keep (that is, no access charge: a = 0, or
m =  cT =  0:5) thus constitutes the most protable reciprocal access agreement
in this range.
 In the range m  m^ (s), I corners the market by charging FI = f + s   (m)  
mq(c + m); E thus obtains no prot, whereas Is prot increases with m (as this
reduces the competitive pressure exerted by the entrant operator, and allows the
incumbent operator to charge a higher subscription fee), to such an extent that it
becomes higher than in any shared-market equilibrium (even with bill and keep)
when m is large enough (namely, when m > 22). Therefore, I will prefer to corner
the market with a large enough access mark-up rather than sharing the market with
lower or below-cost access charges.
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Figure 2.a. Is prot. Figure 2.b. Es prot.
Next, we consider the impact of the access charge on total welfare (W ), which is given
by (7), and on consumer surplus (CS), net of subscription fees as well as switching and
transport costs, which is given by:
CS = (2I + 
2
E)v(c) + 2IEv(c+m)  IFI   EFE
 Es 
Z I
0
txdx 
Z 1
I
t(1  x)dx:
Figure 3a presents the impact of the access charge on total welfare, W , in the range
m < m^ (s), and remains constant afterwards. Interestingly, in this example total welfare
always increases with m as long as the networks share the market. As both prots
decrease in m as long as the market remains shared, and Is prot increases with m when
it corners the market, it follows that, as illustrated by Figure 3b, consumer surplus (which
can be expressed as total welfare minus industry prot) rst increases with m as long as
m < m^ (s), and decreases afterwards for a su¢ ciently high access charge, it may even
lie below the level achieved for m = 0.
15
Figure 3.a. Total Welfare. Figure 3.b. Consumer Surplus.
6 The role of termination-based price discrimination
We now stress that on-net pricing is key to protable foreclosure. More precisely, we rst
show that foreclosure is never protable in the absence of termination-based price dis-
crimination, and then note that it would not even be feasible if in addition networks were
adopting the so-called receiver-pays regime, in which network operators also charge
users for receiving calls.
Caller-pays regime
We consider here the same setup as before, except that networks cannot charge di¤erent
prices for o¤-net and on-net calls; that is: p^i = pi for i = I; E:
i  i [(pi   c)q(pi) + Fi   f ] + ijm (q(pj)  q(pi))
The same argument as in Lemma 1 then yields again cost-based usage pricing in any
shared-market equilibrium, namely:
pi = c+ jm:
Under a cost-based access charge (i.e., m = 0), networks price calls at cost (pi = c)
and the equilibrium is thus the same as before. The next Proposition shows that it is
never protable for the incumbent to raise the access charge so as to corner the market:
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Proposition 4 In the absence of the termination-based price discrimination:
(i) When s  s = 3t, I corners the market even under cost-based termination (m = 0);
raising the access charge above cost then reduces Is equilibrium prot.
(ii) When instead s < s, raising the access charge above cost is never protable for I,
even if it enables it to foreclose the market.
Proof. See Appendix H.
The intuition is simple, and comes from the fact that increasing the access charge
tends to make the entrant more aggressive. As noted by the literature (see, e.g., Carter
andWright (2003)21 and López (2008)), increasing the access charge induces both network
operators to raise their usage prices, and even more so for the entrant (because it has a
higher proportion of o¤-net calls); this, in turn, creates an access revenue for the entrant,
which then competes more aggressively for subscribers through a lower fee. This e¤ect is
most easily seen when the access charge already enables I to corner the market. In this
case:
 Attracting a consumer with a fee FE, together with a usage price reecting the
perceived cost of o¤-net calls, would give E a prot equal to FE   f + mq (c),
where the last term represents the termination revenue that E would earn from Is
incoming calls; therefore, E is willing to o¤er any fee (together with pE = c + m)
down to
FE = f  mq (c) : (11)
 To corner the market, I must o¤er a net surplus wI matching wE + t s; to be sure,
the higher usage price charged by E allows I to maintain a fee di¤erential: more
precisely, it can o¤er wI = wE + t  s by charging22
FI = FE + s  t+ v (c)  v (c+m) (12)
= FE + s   (m) :
The expression in (11) conrms that an increase in the access charge makes the en-
trant more aggressive, by increasing the termination revenue mq (c) attached to any new
subscriber. The expression in (12) shows that this e¤ect is partially compensated by the
fee di¤erential, as reected in the term v (c)   v (c+m), that I can a¤ord given Es
higher usage price. Yet an increase in m increases the termination revenue mq (c) more
21To capture brand loyalty, Carter and Wright (2003) introduce a parameter , representing the extra
benets from belonging to the incumbent network: A consumer joining Is network located at a distance
x obtains a gross utility given by u(q)  tx+t. The parameter  thus plays the same role as a switching
cost s = t.
22Indeed, s  s = 3t and m > 0 together imply FI > FE .
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than it does to the fee di¤erential v (c) v (c+m),23 and as a result Is equilibrium prot
is reduced.
Receiver-pays regime
In most European countries mobile operators do not charge subscribers for receiving calls,
even if this is not explicitly forbidden by NRAs. In contrast, in the United States mobile
network operators usually charge subscribers for the calls they receive. Jeon, La¤ont and
Tirole (2004) and López (2011)24 show that, when networks compete in three-part tari¤s
of the form fFi; pi; rig, where ri denotes a per-unit reception charge, then in equilibrium
they charge call origination and call reception at the o¤-net cost25:
pi = c+m; ri =  m:
Moreover, when setting usage prices at the o¤-net cost, is prot writes as ^i = i(Fi; Fj) (Fi   f),
which does not depend on m. In other words, m a¤ects usage prices but not the intensity
of competition in subscription fees. As a result, the access charge has no impact on equi-
librium prots. Therefore, in the absence of on-net pricing, networks cannot use access
charges to soften or foreclose competition when they charge for incoming calls.
7 Conclusion
We have examined the impact of reciprocal access charges on entry when consumers face
switching costs, and networks compete in three-part tari¤s, charging possibly di¤erent
prices for o¤-net calls. The analysis shows that when switching costs are su¢ ciently large,
high (reciprocal) access charges allow the incumbent to foreclose the market and exploit
fully the resulting monopoly power.
Foreclosure strategies are protable here only when they result in complete entry
deterrence: While the incumbent can increase its market share by insisting on above-
cost reciprocal charges, as long as the entrant keeps attracting some subscribers, raising
23Indeed, for m > 0:
d
dm
(v (c)  v (c+m) mq (c)) = q (c+m)  q (c) < 0:
24López (2011) generalizes the framework of Jeon, La¤ont and Tirole (2004) by allowing a random
(non-vanishing) noise in both the callersand receiversutilities, by removing the assumption of a given
proportionality between the utility functions, and by allowing asymmetry between rms with respect to
the installed customer bases.
25López (2011) show that this equilibrium exists and is unique even if the random noise of the utilities
does not vanish, and thereby receivers can hang up. Cambini and Valletti (2008), and Jeon, La¤ont and
Tirole (2004), however, consider the case of vanishing noise, where the caller determines the volume of
calls most of the time.
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the termination charge intensies price competition and, as a result, both operators
equilibrium prots are lower than when the reciprocal access charge is at or below cost.
In other words, limiting entry without deterring it entirely is never protable.
Finally, the network e¤ects created by termination-based price discrimination appear
to be a key ingredient for protable foreclosure strategies: In the absence of on-net pricing,
the incumbent does not nd it protable to foreclose competition through high access
charges. In addition, in a receiver-pays regime, the incumbent operator cannot use the
access charge to foreclose competition.
The policy implications of this analysis support a call for regulatory intervention in
markets where an incumbent faces potential competition from a new entrant. This reg-
ulatory intervention could take the form of a cap on the reciprocal termination charge,
and possibly a lower cap for access to the incumbent network (asymmetric regulation).
Setting these caps would however require detailed knowledge of cost and demand com-
petition; an alternative, possibly softer and more easily enforceable form of regulatory
intervention would be to ban termination-based price discrimination or to move towards
a receiver-pays regime.
To rene these policy implications, further research can extend the analysis in at least
two directions. First, it would be interesting to allow for the arrival of new customers,
unattached to the incumbent network. Cornering its customer base would however make
the incumbent network more attractive to these new customers as well. Hence, when there
are relatively few new customers, the incumbent operator should still be able to foreclose
the entrant when access charges are high enough. However, complete foreclosure is likely
to become more di¢ cult, and probably less protable, as the proportion of new customers
increases. Exploring further the possibility and protability of such foreclosure, as a
function of the proportion of new consumers, would contribute to identify the situations
in which foreclosure may be a serious concern.
Second, our model features only one incumbent and one entrant. While the analysis
readily extends to the case of multiple entrants, it would be useful to consider as well
the case of tight incumbent oligopolies. The incumbent operators may then face a trade-
o¤ between softening competition among themselves, and ghting the entrant(s). The
literature however shows that the impact of access charges on the competition between
incumbents depends critically on several factors, such as the type of tari¤s, demand het-
erogeneity and arbitrage possibilities. For instance, La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show
that while raising the access charge above cost yields higher usage prices, it can also trig-
ger more intense competition for subscribers (as they bring termination revenues) when
networks compete in other dimensions. Hence, while incumbent operators favor high ac-
cess charges when they simply compete in (uniform) linear prices, in the case of two-part
tari¤s, for instance, this waterbed e¤ect26 can induce networks to reduce their xed
26The term "waterbed e¤ect" was rst coined by Prof. Paul Geroski during the investigation of the
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fees, up to the point that the termination charge no longer a¤ects equilibrium prots.
López (2008) however points out that, in a dynamic setting, networks can still use (fu-
ture) reciprocal access charges to soften competition.27 By contrast, as discussed above,
termination-based price discrimination (i.e., on-net pricing) generates network e¤ects
which further intensify competition for subscribers, and as a result incumbent operators
would rather favor termination charges that are below cost. However, as stressed by
Armstrong and Wright (2009), the possibility of arbitrage between (high) xed-to-mobile
(FTM) and (low) mobile-to-mobile (MTM) charges28 may still induce mobile operators
to favor high termination charges.29 Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2013), Hoernig,
Inderst and Valletti (2014), Hurkens and López (2014), and Tangerås (2014) provide
alternative explanations for why rms may prefer above-cost access charges, based re-
spectively on demand heterogeneity, unbalanced calling patterns, alternative forms of
consumer expectations, and income e¤ects. Our analysis suggests that foreclosure may
provide one additional motive for doing so.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses wI and wE and thus market shares 
constant, network is optimal prices pi and p^i maximize
i fi [(pi   c)q(pi) + v(pi)] + j [(p^i   c m)q(p^i) + v(p^i)]  wi   fg+ ijmq(p^j);
which yields marginal-cost pricing. 
B Proof of Lemma 2
If consumers anticipate market shares I and E = 1  I , they expect a net surplus
wi = iv(c) + jv(c+m)  Fi
impact of xed-to-mobile termination charges on retail prices. See also Genakos and Valletti (2011).
27Departing from cost-based termination charges adversely a¤ects larger networks, which in turn re-
duces networksincentives to build market shares.
28Historically, xed and mobile operators were not really competing against each other, and thus a tra-
ditional "one-way access" analysis applied. Termination charges between those two types of networks are
moreover usually asymmetric, di¤erent termination costs and regulatory constraints leading to relatively
low charges for mobile-to-xed calls and substantially higher charges for xed-to-mobile calls.
29If mobile operators must adopt the same termination charge for FTM and MTM calls, this uniform
charge may then be above cost if the waterbed e¤ect on FTM is limited or if operators set their own
charges unilaterally.
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from joining network i, for i 6= j = I; E. A consumer located at a distance x 2 [0; 1]
from network I is therefore willing to stay with that network when wI   tx  wE  
t(1   x)   s, and prefers to switch otherwise. In a shared-market outcome, the actual
consumer response, ^i, as a function of consumersexpectation i, is therefore given by
max fmin f^i(i); 1g ; 0g, where:
^i(i) =
1
2
+
wi   wj + is
2t
=
1
2
+
Fj   Fi + is
2t
+
v(c)  v(c+m)
t

i   1
2

;
with I = 1 and E =  1.
Condition (1) implies that the slope d^i=di is lower than 1, or
 (m) = t  [v(c)  v(c+m)] > 0: (13)
Indeed, as  0 (m) =  q (c+m) < 0, it follows that  (m) >  (+1), which is positive
under (1). This, in turn, ensures that consumersresponse to subscription fees is always
unique (and stable). When the market is shared, network is market share corresponds
to the xed point i = ^i(i), which leads to (2). 
C Proof of Proposition 3
As already noted in the proof of Lemma 2, condition (1) implies  (m) > 0. From Lemma
1, in any shared-market equilibrium networks charge (perceived) cost-based usage prices:
pS = c and p^S = c + m. The same reasoning applies to small deviations: As long as the
market remains shared, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to deviations
that involve cost-based usage pricing. Following such a deviation, network is prot can
be written as (for i 6= j = I; E):
i = i (FI ; FE) [Fi   f + j (FI ; FE)mq(c+m)] : (14)
The rst-order and second-order derivatives of this prot with respect to network is
subscription fee Fi are respectively equal to:
@i
@Fi
=  Fi   f + j (FI ; FE)mq(c+m)
2 (m)
+ i (FI ; FE)

1 +
mq(c+m)
2(m)

=  ' (m)Fi   [ (m) +mq(c+m)] (Fj + is)   (m) [f +  (m)]
2 2 (m)
;
@2i
@F 2i
=   ' (m)
2 2 (m)
:
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where
' (m) = 2(m) +mq(c+m):
In a shared-market equilibrium, the rst-order conditions
@i
@Fi
= 0 (15)
must be satised for i = I; E, as well as the second-order conditions, which boil down to
' (m)  0: (16)
Conversely, under (16) network is prot i is globally concave; the local conditions
(15) thus rule out any deviations to shared-market outcomes, including the limit cases
i = 0 and i = 1. This, in turn, rules out any larger deviation:
 Network i cannot benet from pricing itself out, as this would yield the same
prot (zero) as in the limit case i = 0.
 Any deviation in which network i corners the market would involve lower margins
than the limit case i = 1, without attracting any additional subscriber. To see this, it
su¢ ces to note that:
 Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations involving an on-
net price equal to cost: p = c (when deviating, it remains optimal to maximize the
gains from trade)
 The deviating prot is thus simply equal to
i = Fi   f;
which is of the form (14) for i (FI ; FE) = 1.
 And in order to corner the market, I must o¤er a subscription fee FDI that is
su¢ ciently attractive, namely, such that wDI  t   s + wSE, where wSE denotes the
surplus corresponding to Es equilibrium o¤er, when all other consumers subscribe
to I:
wDI = v(c)  FDI  t  s+ wDE = t  s+ v(c+m)  F SE
which implies that FDI cannot exceed the level such that I
 
FDI ; F
S
E

= 1.
The rst-order condition (15) yields network is best response to the rival fee Fj: for
i 6= j 2 fI; Eg,
Fi = F
r
i (Fj) 
 (m) +mq (c+m)
' (m)
(Fj + is) +
 (m)
' (m)
[f +  (m)] :
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Combining the above best-responses yields the expressions (4) and (5) for the equilibrium
subscription fees and market shares.
To be stable, the equilibrium must satisfy j@F ri =@Fjj < 1. This, in turn, implies
 (m) > 0:
When (m)+mq(c+m)  0, (16) implies that subscription fees are (weak) strategic
complements (@F ri =@Fj  0), in which case consumer-response stability, i.e., condition
(13), implies both (price) stability (@F ri =@Fj  1) and
 (m) = 2 [(m) +mq(c+m)] + (m) > 0:
 When instead (m) + mq(c + m) < 0, subscription fees are strategic substitutes
(@F ri =@Fj < 0), in which case (price) stability requires:
1 >  @F
r
i
@Fj
=    (m) +mq (c+m)
2 (m) +mq (c+m)
,  (m) = 3 (m) + 2mq (c+m) > 0:
Conversely, when  (m) > 0:
 The candidate equilibrium market shares dened by (5) satisfy I = 1  E > 0.
 These market shares also satisfy I = 1  E < 1 if and only if (3) holds.
Finally, together with (13), condition (3) implies:
' (m) =
 (m) +  (m)
2
> 0:
Therefore, (3) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a stable, shared-
market equilibrium. In addition, when this condition holds, the shared-market equilibrium
is unique and characterized by the subscription fees and market shares given by (4) and
(5). 
D Proof of Proposition 1
Using (14), (4) and (5), network is equilibrium prot can be written as, for i 6= j 2 fI; Eg:
i = 
S
i

F Si   f + Sjmq(c+m)

=
1
2

1 +
is
 (m)

(m) +
(m) +mq(c+m)
 (m)
s+
1
2

1  is
 (m)

mq(c+m)

=
' (m)
4

1 +
is
 (m)
2
: (17)
where ' (m) = 2(m) +mq(c+m) > 0.
It is straightforward to check that, for m  0, both ' and  strictly decrease with m.
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It follows that Es prot decreases with m when m  0; by continuity, the same is true
for m slightly negative.
We now show that Is prot satises I (m) < I (0) for any m > 0. Since I = 1 and
2 (m) = 3' (m) +mq (c+m) > 3' (m) in the range m > 0, we have:
I(m) =
' (m)
4

1 +
s
 (m)
2
< 	 (m)   (m)
6

1 +
s
 (m)
2
;
where
	0 (m) =
d
d 
"
 
6

1 +
s
 
2#
 0 =
1
6

1 +
s
 

1  s
 

 0 =
2
3
SI
 
1  SI

 0 < 0:
As  0 (m) < 0 and SI 2 (0; 1) in the relevant range, it follows that 	0 (m) < 0. 	 (0) =
I (0), for m > 0 we have:
I(m) < 	 (m) < 	 (0) = I (0) :
Similarly, for m < 0 we have 2 (m) < 3' (m) and thus:
I(m) > 	 (m) :
As 	 (0) = I (0) and 	0 (0) < 0, I (m) > I (0) for m slightly negative. 
E Welfare
Taking the derivative of the expression of total welfare given by (7), we have:
dW S
dm
(m) =

2

SI (m)  SE (m)

v(c) + 2

SE (m)  SI (m)

[v (c+m) +mq (c+m)]
+s  tSI (m) + tSE (m)
	 dSI
dm
(m) + 2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m)
=

s  2SI (m)  1 [t  2v(c) + 2v (c+m) + 2mq (c+m)]	 dSIdm (m)
+2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m) ;
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which, using the expression of the market shares given by (4), and noting that the second
term within square brackets can be expressed as 2 (m)  t+ 2mq (c+m), boils down to:
dW S
dm
(m) =

s  2s
 (m)
[2 (m)  t+ 2mq (c+m)]

dSI
dm
(m) + 2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m)
=
s
 (m)
f3 (m) + 2mq (c+m)  [2 (m)  t+ 2mq (c+m)]g d
S
I
dm
(m)
+2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m)
=
s
 (m)
[t+  (m)]
dSI
dm
(m) + 2SI (m)
S
E (m)mq
0 (c+m) : 
F Proof of Proposition 2
For the sake of exposition, we restrict attention to equilibria in which networks still
set usage prices at perceived marginal costs. In such a candidate equilibrium, consumers
located at the other end of the segment must prefer to stick to Is network: v (c) t FI 
v (c+m)  s FE. Furthermore, if this inequality holds strictly then I could increase its
subscription fee and still corner the market. Therefore, the inequality must be binding,
which amounts to:
FI = FE    (m) + s: (18)
In addition, E should not be able to make a prot by attracting some consumers, and
conversely I should not gain from increasing its fee at the expense of market share. In
the light of the previous analysis, it su¢ ces to consider local deviations:
Lemma 4 Consider a candidate equilibrium in which I corners the market with cost-
based usage prices and subscription fees satisfying (18). The rst-order conditions
@I
@FI
 0; @E
@FE
 0; (19)
where the prots I and E are given by (14), provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for the existence of such an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider rst deviations inducing a shared-market outcome, in which case with-
out loss of generality we can restrict attention to deviant o¤ers based on cost-based usage
prices; the associated prot is thus given by (14). Furthermore, for m  0 condition (13)
ensures that this prot is strictly concave (i.e., ' (m) > 0). Therefore, the rst-order
conditions (19) provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this kind of deviations.
The condition for I furthermore ensures that I makes a prot (as it is not be protable
for I to price itself out of the market, so as to induce I
 
FDI ; FE

= 0).
The same reasoning as in Appendix C can then be used to rule out largerdeviations
inducing a cornered-market outcome: No network i can benet from pricing itself out,
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and conversely any deviation aiming at cornering the market would involve lower margins
than the boundary case i = 1, without attracting any additional subscriber.
The rst-order condition for E amounts to say that it should not be able to make a
prot by attracting its closest consumers, namely:
FE  f  mq (c+m) :
Conversely, I should not gain from a marginal increase in its fee:
0  @I
@FI

I=1
=  FI   f
2 (m)
+ 1 +
mq(c+m)
2(m)
=   1
2 (m)
[FI   f   2(m) mq(c+m)] ;
which, using (18), amounts to:
FE  f + 3 (m) +mq (c+m)  s:
Es fee must therefore lie in the range
f  mq (c+m)  FE  f + 3 (m) +mq (c+m)  s; (20)
which is feasible only when s  3 (m) + 2mq (c+m) =  (m), or m  m^.
Conversely, any pair of subscription fees (FI ; FE) satisfying (18) and (20) constitutes
an equilibrium where I corners the market. Among those equilibria, only one does not
rely on weakly dominated strategies for E, and is therefore trembling-hand perfect, this
is the one where FE = f  mq(c+m) and FI = f + s  (m) mq(c+m). 
G Proof of Proposition 3
Let
F (s) = CI (1) = s  t+ 
denote the maximal prot from foreclosure, and
S (s) = SI (0) =
t
2

1 +
s
3t
2
denote the prot from sharing the market under a cost-based access charge.
The function F (s) increases linearly in s whereas S (0) increases quadratically in
s; furthermore, for s = 0, F (0) < S (0). If follows that F (s) lies above S (s) in a
range s 2 (s1; s2), where s1 and s2 are the two solutions to F (s) = S (s), which are
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respectively given by
s1 = 3t
 
2 
r
1 + 2

t
!
; s2 = 3t
 
2 +
r
1 + 2

t
!
:
The second solution, s2, exceeds the upper bound on the switching cost, s = 3t, above
which the market cannot be shared even with a cost-based access charge. By contrast, s1
lies below this upper bound; it however still exceeds the lower bound on the switching
cost, s = 3 (t ), below which the market would remain shared even with an innite
access charge. Therefore, in the relevant range s 2 [s; s], foreclosure is protable (i.e.,
CI (1) > SI (0)) if and only if s > s1. 
H Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which I corners the market. Marginal cost pricing
then yields pI = c; however, as no calls are originating from its network, E may charge
pE 6= c + m. For I to corner the market, it must be the case that even the consumers
closest to E favor I, that is, v(c)   t   FI  v(pE)   s   FE, where FI and FE denote
the candidate equilibrium fees. Furthermore, as I maximizes its prot, this inequality
cannot be strict; therefore:
FI = FE   [t  v(c) + v(pE)] + s: (21)
In addition, E should not make any prot by stealing a few customers. The best such
deviation involves p0E = c+m (from marginal cost pricing) and a fee slightly below
F 0E = FE   v (pE) + v (c+m) : (22)
Such deviation is unprotable if it generates a non-positive margin (taking into account
the termination revenue that E would receive from I), that is, only if:
F 0E  f  mq (c) : (23)
Combining (21), (22) and (23) yields an upper bound on the prot that I can achieve in
a cornered market equilibrium:
CI = FI   f  CI (m)  s  [ (m) +mq (c)] : (24)
This expression is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to CI (0) = s  t. Therefore, when
s > s = 3t, in which case there is no shared-market equilibria and thus I always corners
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the market, Is prot is maximal for m = 0.30 We now show that, when s < s, I cannot
gain from departing from m = 0 in order to corner the market. It su¢ ces to show
CI (0) = s  t < SI (0) =
t
2
+
s
3

1 +
s
6t

,
which amounts to: (s)  s
3
 
2  s
6t
   3t
2
< 0. Since (3t) = 0 and 0(s) > 0 (when
s < 3t), it follows that (s) < 0 for s < s = 3t. 
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